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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
ALAN G. ROSS, a single man; LARRY R. BROWN,
a married man as to his sole and separate
property; MICHAEL R. MURPHY and NANCY B.
MURPHY, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,

v.
TOMMY A. DORSEY and ERIN T. DORSEY, husband
and wife,
Defendants/Appellant,
and
The ESTATES OF F.M. HARKER and GLADYS L.
HARKER; BANK OF THE CASCADES, dba FARMERS &
MERCHANTS BANK, an Oregon corporation doing
business in the State of Idaho; BANNER
BANK, a Washington corporation doing
business in the State of Idaho; and any and
all other claimants in and to that common
beach area being approximately 20 feet wide
and 132.87 feet long and consisting of all
that property lying between the shore of
Priest Lake and the West boundary of Lot 1
Steamboat Bay Lots according to the Plat
thereof as recorded on February 21, 1966,
in the records of Bonner County, Idaho,
Book 2 of Plats, Page 125, located in
Government Lot 5 Section 27, Township 60
North, Range 4 West, Boise Meridian, Bonner
County, Idaho,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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Defendants.

* * * * *
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner

* * * *
THE HONORABLE STEVE VERBY, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING

* * * *
GARY A. FINNEY
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A.
120 E. Lake Street, Ste 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(Attorney for Dorsey Defendant - Appellant)

Edward J. Anson
Attorney at Law
608 Northwest Blvd., Suite 300
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(Attorney for Banner Bank)
Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, CHTD.
Attorneys & Counselors at Law
113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(Attorney for
Plaintiffs/Respondents)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(i)

Nature of Case.

Plaintiffs brought this action seeking quiet title to
the disputed strip of land as being co-owners of the
disputed property.

Defendant Harker, deceased, is the last

record vested title owner.
platted Lot 1.

Defendant DORSEY is owner of the

Plaintiffs claim there is a strip of land

lying between Lot 1 and Priest Lake.

DORSEY claims there is

no such strip of land, as it is platted as a portion of Lot
1.

Plaintiffs must rely on the strength of their own title

and that they have no right, title, claim, or interest in
the disputed property.
(ii) Course of Proceedings Below and The Trial.
A.

The Action - Complaint

Ross, Brown, and Murphy filed a Complaint for Quiet
Title against the ESTATE of Harker, and DORSEY, for judgment
for quiet title to the disputed property as an alleged
common beach area, 20 feet in width and 132.87 feet in
length lying between the water of Priest Lake and the West
boundary of Lot 1 Steamboat Bay Lots according to the Plat
thereof.

Plaintiff alleged vested Title remained in Harker.

(R. Vol. 1, p. 14, para X)
B.

Answer/Counterclaim

DORSEY filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Cross-Claim
which alleged that Plaintiffs received no conveyance for the
real estate at issue, and acquired no title from anyone.
The Plat of Steamboat Bay by Harker had no dedication or any
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wording creating a common beach.

Harker stated specifically

in the Owner's Certification that the platted Lot 1
sidelines extended to Priest Lake - so the property at issue
was platted as part of Lot 1.

A reservation in the Deed

from Harker to DORSEY'S predecessor in interest, Wright,
reserving an interest in Harker, but never conveyed out by
Harker, could not create ownership interest in Plaintiffs.
DORSEY owns Lot I, which includes the disputed property,
according to the Plat thereof.
C.

Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, with no
specificity or particularity stated.

Their Memorandum in

Support, in the Conclusion section, requested the Court to
find and conclude that they, together with DORSEY, were cotenants and co-owners of real property lying between the
mean high water mark of Priest Lake and the west boundary of
Lot 1, Steamboat Bay Plat, based on common law dedication.
They also claim that the language of a reservation in the
Harker to Wright deed (1966) for Lot 1 created such a common
ownership.

DORSEY obtained a Warranty Deed for Lot 1 and 2

from Wright in 1999.
DORSEY filed an Objection, moving the Court to deny
summary judgment, with supporting affidavits (by Nitella
Wright and A.B. Shobe), and a Memorandum in Opposition.

The

motion was argued (3/17/2010) to District Judge Charles
Hosack who said at the hearing that he denied summary
judgment, but directed a partial summary judgment that there
-5-

is not a fee simple title ownership of Dorsey to the
disputed property.

An Order, by District Judge Hosack was

filed April 28, 2010 that the Court finds Dorsey holds no
fee simple interest in the beachfront property, as title was
reserved in the initial conveyance (1966) of Lot 1 from
Harker to Wright.

Dorsey filed May 12, 2010 a detailed and

particular Motion To Set Aside, Alter, Amend, and Reconsider
Court's Order filed April 28, 2010.

This was not taken up

until and as part of the trial - to District Judge Steve
Verby, held June 27, and 28, 2011.
D.

Amended Complaint/Amended Answer and Counterclaim

Plaintiffs subsequently filed an Amended Complaint For
Quiet Title (9-15-2010) (R., Vol. 2, p. 190).

The Amended

Complaint has the same Exhibits A, B, and C as the
Complaint.

Dorsey filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim

By Dorsey (12-15-2010) (R., Vol. 2, p. 223).

The Amended

Complaint alleged the language of the Plat itself created a
cloud on title to ownership of a Common Beach, but did not
re-allege that the Plat created/dedicated a Common Beach.
Their claim of an ownership interest was based solely on the
attempted reservation in a Warranty Deed, signed 21 Feb
1966, Harker to Wright, recorded 12 years later on May 18,
1978, Instrument No. 200169,

(Exhibit "A" - R., Vol. 2, p.

202) which stated:
"It is specifically understood that the grantors
reserve, as a common beach for all owners in said
plat, that certain tract and beach lying between
the mean high water line and the West boundary
line of said Lot One. Said reserved beach being a
-6-

tract approximately 20 feet wide between the
waters of Priest Lake and the West boundary of the
above described Lot One, and 132.87 feet in
length."
They claim that,
"The above quoted language by Harker resulted in
the reservation and creation of a Common Beach ara
(sic) for the benefit of all owners of the
Steamboat Bay Lots."
Amended Complaint For Quiet Title
R. Vol. 2, p. 195, para IX.
By the Amended Complaint, the claim for relief was
based solely and only the words of reservation in the Harker
to Wright, Warranty Deed.

At no time did Ross, Brown, and

Murphy plead, allege, or argue that the Owner's
Certification by Harker on the Plat was "ambiguous", nor
that it created an "easement", which were the District
Court's ultimate finding.

The Amended Complaint added

Farmers & Merchants Bank and Banner Bank, the deed of trust
lienholders on the DORSEY Lots 1 and 2.

The Farmers &

Merchant's Bank were defaulted. Banner Bank answered the
Amended Complaint by Attorney Edward J. Anson, but did not
appear for trial, nor did its Attorney Anson.
District Judge Verby took the matter under advisement,
and reconvened Court on June 30, 2011 to orally announce his
decision.

The District Judge's announcement included

findings, conclusions, and his decision directing entry of
judgment for Ross, Brown, and Murphy against Dorsey,
reported at TR. p. 313 through 330.
Judge Verby's ruling was that the Owner's Certification
was ambiguous, which was neither pled nor argued.
-7-

He

determined the "intent" of Harker by the Owner's
Certification was to create an easement in favor of all of 8
lots in the Plat.

He denied any recovery on the actual

claim for relief of the Amended Complaint that the
reservation in the Harker to Wright, Warranty Deed, created
a co-tenancy/co-ownership in the reserved real estate at
issue.

Judgment was entered July 26, 2011.

(R., Vol. 2, p.

272)
This is the wording of the Owner's Certification on the
Plat by Harker in 1966:
Owner's Certification
"It is the intent of the Owners that Lot 1 and the
20 foot private road as shown on the herein plat
shall include the lands lying between the side
lines produced to the mean-high-water line of
Priest Lake."
"The use of the 20 foot Private Road as shown on
the herein plat is hereby dedicated to the
adjacent lot owners. Access to public road cannot
be guaranteed."
Dorsey filed a Notice of Appeal (8-19-2011), and
pursuant to Order of the Idaho Supreme Court, filed an
Amended Notice of Appeal (9-21-2011).
Ross, Brown, and Murphy filed no Cross-Appeal.
are Respondents only.
(iii)

They

The Banks filed no Cross-Appeal.

A Concise Statement of the Facts.

Plaintiffs, who are Respondents on appeal, are referred
to as ROSS, BROWN, and MURPHY.

They filed a Complaint For

Quiet Title against the Estates of F.M. Harker and Gladys L.
Harker, deceased, referred to as HARKER, and alleged that
HARKER was the vested title holder of the real estate at
-8-

issue.

They did not serve Harker with process.

The other

defendant is DORSEY, who is the Appellant, referred to as
DORSEY, who owns Lots 1 and 2 of the Plat.

The Complaint

alleged that HARKER filed a Plat of Steamboat Bay Lots,
recorded February 21, 1966 in Bonner County, concerning a
small parcel of their land (200 feet X approximately 900 ft)
adjacent to Priest Lake, Idaho, platted into Lots 1 through
8.

A copy of the Plat is Exhibit "A" to the Complaint.

Vol. 1, p. 19)

(R.,

Lot 1 is adjacent to Priest Lake, with Lots

2 through 8 lying easterly, with a plat dedicating use of
the road on the south side of all the lots.
The OWNER'S CERTIFICATION by HARKER on the Plat
consisting of the metes and bounds legal description
followed by 2 separate 1 sentence paragraphs, as follows:
"It is the intent of the Owners that Lot 1 and the
20 foot private road as shown on the herein plat
shall include the lands lying between the side
lines produced to the mean-high-water line of
Priest Lake."
"The use of the 20 foot Private Road as shown on
the herein plat is hereby dedicated to the
adjacent lot owners. Access to public road cannot
be guaranteed."
(Signed and acknowledged by Harker
on 17 Feb 1966)
The Plat contains "dashed" lines from both the north
and the south side lines of Lot 1 extending to the mean high
water line labeled Priest Lake.

DORSEY claims the first

sentence of the Owner's Certification, clearly and
unequivocally states that the disputed land is platted as
part of Lot 1.
-9-

HARKER, sold Lot 1, to Wright, on a contract for deed,
and as grantors signed a Warranty Deed, dated 21 Feb 1966,
placed in an escrow collection of the Old National Bank of
Spokane, Washington, conveying Lot 1 to the grantees R.G.
Wright and Nitella Wright, hereinafter WRIGHT.

When WRIGHT

paid off the escrow collection, the Warranty Deed was
recorded on May 18, 1978, Instrument No. 200169, which is 12
years after i t was signed.
"B" to the Complaint,

This Warranty Deed is Exhibit

(R., Vol. 1, p. 20) and it created the

basis of the sole claim for relief of the Amended Complaint
as it contained these words,
"It is specifically understood that the grantors
reserve, as a common beach for all owners in said
plat, that certain tract and beach lying between
the mean high water line and the West boundary
line of said Lot One.
Said reserved beach being a
tract approximately 20 feet wide between the
waters of Priest Lake and the West boundary of the
above described Lot One, and 132.87 feet in
length."
ROSS, BROWN, and MURPHY acquired their individual lots
from subsequent intervening owners of lots in the Plat; ROSS
acquired Lots 5 and 6, BROWN acquired Lots 3 and 4, and
MURPHY acquired Lots 7 and 8.

Through intervening deed

restrictions, LO'l;s 3 and 4 were joined as a single lot; Lots
5 and 6 were joined as a single lot, and Lots 7 and 8 were
joined as a single lot.

The chain of title deeds are all

trial exhibits, and are not disputed.
Lot 2 was also sold and deeded by HARKER to WRIGHT.
Nitella Wright, widowed, in 1999 ultimately sold and
conveyed Lots 1 and 2 to DORSEY.
-10-

That Warranty Deed is

attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "C".

(R. Vol. I, p. 21)

DORSEY'S Warranty Deed language conveys to them all of the
following described real property, to-wit (emphasis added) :
"Lots 1 and 2 in Steamboat Bay Lots, according the
plat thereof, recorded in Book 2 of Plats, page
125, records of Bonner County, Idaho."
The Warranty Deed further stated that Grantor does
covenant to Grantees that she is the owners in fee simple
absolute of said premises, that is free from all
encumbrances and limitations except as follows:
"SUBJECT TO"
Following the "Subject To:" were, matters listed and
described as 1 through 10.

The listed subject to number 5,

stated,
"5. Terms, provisions, covenants, conditions,
definitions, options, obligations and
restrictions contained in a document, Instrument
No. 200169, recorded May 18, 1978."
The Harker/Wright "reservation" was unknown to DORSEY
when they purchased, nor did they know that the SUBJECT TO:
number 5 document recorded Instrument No. 200169, recorded
May 18, 1978 was referencing the Warranty Deed (1966),
Harker to Wright.

DORSEY bought Lots 1 and 2 from widow

Wright represented as Lot 1 being waterfront property owned
by Wright, without any property, reserved or excepted, by
Wright or Harker.

The Warranty Deed conveyance language was

for "Lots 1 and 2 in Steamboat Bay Lots, according to the
Plat thereof (emphasis added), recorded in

If

The words,

according to the plat thereof refer to the fact that the
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Owner's Certificate on the Plat,

(Exhibit "A" to Complaint,

R. Vol. 1 p. 19) declared the intent of the owners (Harker)
that Lot 1 did include (emphasis added) the land between the
sidelines extended to Priest Lake.

In other words, the Plat

created Lot 1 as waterfront extending to and adjoining
Priest Lake.
It is the contention of DORSEY that Lot 1 is described
and platted to the water line (shore) of Priest Lake, so
upon recording the Plat (1966) there has never been any land
lying "between" Lot 1 and Priest Lake.

In effect, the

reservation by Harker to a tract between Priest Lake and Lot
1 was for non-existent land.

However, if Harker reserved

any land i t remained in Harker, and created no right in
Ross, Brown, and Murphy.

Harker no longer owns any of the

platted Lots, or any property.
DORSEY filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Cross-Claim
(R., Vol. 1, p. 23-24) which points out that there was no
"common beach" created or dedicated by the Plat because of
the wording on the Owner's Certification that Lot 1 included
the lands lying between its sidelines produced to the water
of Priest Lake.

(R., Vol. 1, p. 25)

Additionally, DORSEY

alleged that as a matter of law the "reservation" language
in the conveyance of Lot 1, Harker to Wright, could only be
a reservation kept by Harker in themselves, which they
retained and never conveyed.

This reservation created no

rights in third parties, strangers to the conveyance like
ROSS, BROWN, and MURPHY or their predecessors' in title.
-12-

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

District Judge Charles Hosack, who was not the
trial judge, errored in favor of the Respondents
on their Summary Judgment Motion and entered an
Order which is in error as a matter of law in that
Defendant DORSEY was conveyed title by Warranty
Deed from WRIGHTS to all of Lots 1 and 2 according
to the Plat of Steamboat Bay.
The Warranty Deed,
Wright to Dorsey has conveyance language as
stated, and the "Subject to" language of the
Warranty Deed is only a limitation on WRIGHTS'
warranty(s) of title. This is the Warranty deed,
Defendants' Exhibit "A."

II.

The trial judge, District Judge Yerby, made oral
findings of fact and conclusions of law in which
he agreed with the summary judgment decision of
District Judge Hosack, which is in error for the
same reasons District Judge Hosack was in error.

III. District Judge Verby erred and disregarded the
principal of law that in quiet title the issue is
that the Plaintiffs (Respondents) must prove the
sufficiency and strength of their own title and
cannot assert a weakness of the title of the
Defendants (Appellants).
IV.

District Judge Verby erred in ruling that the Plat
dedicated a common use easement for all lot
owners. Even assuming he is correct in that
regard, Harker "reserved" ownership of this area,
so Ross, Brown, and Murphy could not acquire any
right, title, or interest based on the Plat
language.

V.

The District Court erred in finding that the "use"
of common beach property was dedicated by the
original platting party, HARKER, as common
easement. The Plat itself describes HARKERS'
express statement to the contrary, that Lot 1
included the land from the north and south
boundaries of Lot 1 extended to the Lake Bed of
Priest Lake.
In other words, Lot 1 expressly was
platted to include what the District Judge found
to be "common beach." There is no wording of
common beach, common area, or dedication upon the
Plat.

VI.

Assuming for legal analysis that the intention of
Harker by the Plat did dedicate an easement to use
a beach area (disputed strip), Harker in the
Warranty Deed To Wright "reserved" the beach area
(disputed strip) to themselves, so i t is error for

-13-

the District Judge to rule that the Plaintiffs Respondents received any interest in the real
estate at issue by the doctrine of dedication by
the Plat.
VII. There was no delivery and no acceptance of any
supposed dedication of common beach.
VIII.The District Judge found dedication based on a
"totality of circumstances and facts," but did not
find, conclude, or articulate what circumstances
or facts existed to make such finding or
conclusion.
IX.

Upon platting there was no land "lying between the
mean high water line of Priest Lake and the west
boundary of Lot 1 owned by DORSEY. The west
boundary of Lot 1 is platted to be at the same
location on the ground as is the original 1890
ordinary high water line of Priest Lake. District
Judge Verby erred in finding what he described
this beach area as buffer strip being a parcel of
land not lying within platted Lot 1.

X.

Respondents are judicially estopped by their own
Amended Complaint in which they alleged the area
in dispute remained owned/vested in the original
platting party, HARKERS. Respondents could not be
co-owners or co-tenants of the same parcel.

XI.

Respondents' Amended Complaint abandoned the
theory of dedication by the Plat, and dedication
by the Plat was not pled as grounds for relief.
Respondents presented no evidence or argument on
such issue.
The "dedication" of Common Beach
found by District Judge Verby was outside the
scope of the Respondents' grounds for relief.
XII. Respondents did not meet the requirements of Idaho
Code § 5-203 or § 5-205 because they were never
seized or possessed of the real estate within 5 or
20 years as required by law, nor did they bring
this action within the time period.
XIII.The District Judge erred in not finding that
DORSEY has the benefit of Idaho Code § 5-206, as
the owner of legal title to Lot 1, they are
presumed to be the possessor and the Respondents
never held or adversely possessed the property at
issue.
The District Court erred in shifting the
burden of poof, on the issue of adverse possession
onto DORSEYS instead of the Respondents.
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XIV. The District Court erred in finding the
Respondents have a use easement appurtenant to all
8 lots.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
DORSEY claims attorney fees and costs on appeal.

The

basis of the claim is Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.R.C.P.

54(e) (1) and I.A.R. 41.

Based upon the facts and law the

action is brought, pursued, or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR QUIET TITLE
Ross, Brown, and Murphy filed an Amended Complaint For

Quiet Title (R. Vol. 2, pp 192-206).

The Amended Complaint

was very much like the Complaint, except i t did not allege
that the face of the Plat itself reflected a beach area (20
feet X 132.87 feet) located between the ordinary mean high
waters of Priest Lake and the west boundary of Lot 1
"intentionally left unplatted" by Harker.

The quiet title,

claim for relief, was based on the fact that on February 21,
1966, Harkers, by Warranty Deed (Exhibit B to Amended
Complaint), conveyed Lot 1 to WRIGHT, and in the Warranty
Deed, Harker to Wright, was the language,
"It is specifically understood that the grantors
reserve, as a common beach for all owners in said
plat, that certain tract and beach lying between
the mean high water line and the West boundary
line of said Lot One.
Said reserved beach being a
tract approximately 20 feet wide between the
waters of Priest Lake and the West boundary of the
above described Lot One, and 132.87 feet in
length."
(R. Vol. 1, p. 13, para. VII)
Ross, Brown, and Murphy allege that the common beach
-15-

front area (20' X 132.87') is currently held in title by
HARKER, based on Harker's reservation language, who are
believed deceased.
II.

(R. Vol. 1, P 14, para X)

THE AMENDED ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND CROSS-CLAIM
DORSEY contested the Amended Complaint by pointing out,
a)

The Plat did not depict any so-called "common

beach area" dedication of land between the west boundary of
Lot 1 and the waters of Priest Lake because the Plat itself
contained HARKER'S statement in the OWNER'S CERTIFICATION on
the face of the Plat that,
"It is the intent of the Owners that Lot 1 and the
20 foot private road as shown on the herein plat
shall include the lands lying between the side
lines produced to the mean-high-water-line of
Priest Lake."
In other words, Harker did not create a common beach
area because HARKER expressly stated that Lot 1 included
land extended to Priest Lake and the Plat depicted it as
extending to Priest Lake.
b)

The original language in the HARKER to Wright

Warranty Deed, as a reservation in HARKER, as a matter of
law did not create any right, title, or interest in favor of
third parties, i.e., ROSS, BROWN, AND MURPHY or their
predecessors.
c)

Ross, Brown, and Murphy have no basis for quiet

title because they must rely on the strength of their own
title,
1.

have never been conveyed any interest in the
real estate, and the reservation by Harker
created no rights in them, and
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d)

2.

no dedication ever created any right to a
"buffer strip", and if it did, it was later
reserved by and remained vested in Harker.

3.

the Plat itself expressly platted the real
estate at issue as part of Lot 1, and not as
a common beach area.
(R., Vol. 1, p. 28, 29)

F.M. HARKER died and all his real estate interest

passed to his surviving spouse, Gladys L. Harker by Probate
Decree, Bonner County Case No. 10918, recorded 1-20-1972,
Instrument No. 138845.
e)

(R., Vol. 1, p. 31, para 20)

NITELLA WRIGHT executed a Warranty Deed (Exhibit C

to Complaint) to DORSEY for real estate described as Lots 1
and 2 in Steamboat Bay Lots, according to the plat thereof
(emphasis added).

(R., Vol. 1, p. 31, para 22)

III. PLAINTIFF'S (SIC) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Ross, Brown, and Murphy filed a Plaintiff's (sic)
Motion for Summary Judgment, 2-17-2010,

(R., Vol. 1, p. 46)

which was based only on the pleadings and an Affidavit by a
surveyor, Bailey.

Bailey did a Location Survey, which

relied on the original Steamboat Bay Lots, which he attached
as Exhibit A to his Affidavit.

(R., Vol. 1, p. 48-49)

Surveyor Bailey agreed with DORSEY that Lot 1 was platted as
including all land extended to Priest Lake!
IV.

DORSEY'S OBJECTION AND MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS
DORSEY filed an OBJECTION (R. Vol. 1, p. 66) and

supported i t with a Memorandum (R. Vol. 1, p. 83-101) 19
pages in length with citations to legal principals and also
supported by Affidavit of Nitella Wright (R. Vol. 1, p. 102-

-17-

106).

Nitel1a Wright's affidavit was clear and

uncontroverted that Wright bought and owned all of Lot 1
including the land extended to the waters of Priest Lake and
that she conveyed i t all to DORSEY by Warranty Deed for Lots
1 and 2, Steamboat Bay Lots, according the plat as recorded.
DORSEY did not file a summary judgment motion.
V.

ORDER (April 28, 2010) DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BUT PARTIALLY GRANTING A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST DORSEY
District Court Charles W. Hosack heard the matters on

Plaintiff's summary judgment motion on March 17, 2010, and
the record contains a transcript thereof, mistakenly
referring to District Judge Steve Verby as presiding.

At

argument, counsel for DORSEY pointed out the Plat
specifically included the land at issue as being platted as
part of Lot 1 and that Idaho law was that the reservation in
the Warranty Deed from Harker to Wright created no rights in
third parties and is void for creating rights such as the
Plaintiffs.

(R., Vol. 1, p. 25-26).

Ross, Brown, and

Murphy, in quiet title must rely on the strength of their
own title, not an asserted weakness of DORSEY'S title.

To

which arguments, the District Judge responded that no one
would ever put a reservation in a deed because it's "just
null and void" and "that just doesn't make any sense."

(R.,

Vol. 1, p. 25, 11. 18-25).
District Judge Hosack ended the hearing by denying the
Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion, but directing an order
granting partial summary judgment to Ross, Brown, and
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Murphy, against DORSEY, that Dorsey's hold no fee simple
title interest in the beach front property as such title was
specifically reserved from the initial conveyance of Lot 1
from Harker to Dorsey's predecessor, Wright (R., Vol. 1, p.
137).

In other words, the Order, contrary to quiet title

law was based solely on the weakness of DORSEY'S title.
DORSEY points out that the actual Plaintiff's Motion
For Summary Judgment, filed 2-17-2010, generically moves for
"summary judgment" with no particularity or specificity, but
their Memorandum in support ends with the IV. Conclusion
that the Court should find and conclude that Plaintiff's
together with Defendants, are co-tenants and co-owners of
the real property lying between the mean high water mark of
Priest Lake and the west boundary of Lot 1 of Steamboat Bay
Plat.

The Court should further find that the clear and

unambiguous language in the Harker to Wright deed creates
such a common ownership.

(R., Vol. I, p. 62)

District Judge Hosack turned this around on DORSEY in
his Order, to say DORSEY held no fee simple title interest
in the property, which was never even sought in the motion.
DORSEY filed a detailed Motion to Set Aside, Alter,
Amend and Reconsider Court's Order filed April 28, 2010.
(R., Vol. I, p. 139-144).

The Order was only interlocutory.

The action was for "quiet title" to the beach front area,
for which no basis was presented as to their acquisition or
conveyance of title, except the reservation language in the
Harker to Wright Warranty Deed.
-19-

They had the burden to

prove the strength of their own title to the property at
issue, not the weakness of their adversary.
Since the "reservation" was void for all purposes,
Harker conveyed all of Lot 1 to Wright, and Wright
subsequently conveyed all of Lot 1 to DORSEY.
The Order, should be reversed.
VI .

THE LANGUAGE "SUBJECT TO" IN THE WARRANTY DEED, WRIGHT
TO DORSEY DOES NOT CREATE AN EASEMENT
The 1999 Warranty Deed from Wright to Dorsey,

Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 2 (and Exhibit

"c" to Amended

Complaint, R. Vol. 2, p. 203) limits the grantor's
warranties but does not withhold, reserve, or except
anything from the title conveyed.

The conveyance is of

"Lots 1 and 2, in Steamboat Bay Lots, according to the Plat
thereof ... "

The Plat, Owner's Certification, created Lot 1 to

extend all the way to Priest Lake.

The Plat did not create

or leave any unplatted strip of land, or buffer of land,
between Lot 1 and the water line (original ordinary high
water mark) of Priest Lake.
The words in the Warranty Deed, Wright to Dorsey of
"Subject To" item no. 5, Instrument No. 200169, recorded May
18, 1978 (which is the Harker to Wright deed, R. Vol. 2, p.
202) do not create any easement or property right, nor does
it "withhold, reserve, or except" anything from the title
conveyed.

Idaho case law is explicit on this point, as

stated and explained in Capstar Radio qperating Co. v.
Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, at 707, 152 P.3d 581 (2007), as
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follows:
1.
"An easement is the right to use the land of
another for a specific purpose that is not
inconsistent with the general use of the property
by the owners. Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc.
142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196, 204 (2005). An
express easement, being an interest in real
property, may only be created by a written
instrument.
Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773,
554 P.2d 948, 951 (1976) (citing I.C. § 9-503;
McReynolds v. Harrig£eld, 26 Idaho 26, 140 P. 1096
(1914».
"No particular forms or words of art are
necessary [to create an express easement]; i t is
necessary only that the parties make clear their
intention to establish a servitude." Benninger v.
Deri£ield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238
(2006) (quoting Seccombe v. Weeks, 115 Idaho 433,
436, 767 P.2d 276, 279 (Ct.App.1989)."
2.
"In determining that the sale agreement
created an express easement the court focused upon
the following language in paragraph 5: "Subject to
and including an ingress egress easement over this
and adjoining property in said sections 21 and 22
owned by the grantor ... " The question is whether
the parties made clear their intention to
establish a servitude over the Section 21 parcel
subsequently acquired by the Lawrences for the
benefit of other unspecified property owned by the
Funks in Sections 21 and 22. There is nothing in
the sale agreement that indicates an immediate
grant of easement rights. Indeed, the Funks could
not then have granted themselves an easement over
the property being sold to Human Synergistics
since they were the record owners of fee title at
the time."
Caps tar, supra,
143 Idaho 704 at 708

In Capstar, supra, the Warranty Deed words "subject
to:" did not create any easement (servitude), "as it... merely
warrants the property is "free from all encumbrances".
Idaho 704 at 709)

(143

The "subject to" language would exclude

the warranties of title concerning the subject to paragraph
5.
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The foregoing is precisely like the instant Warranty
Deed Harker to Wright, the "subject to" para 5, would merely
exclude warranties of title as to that document/instrument.
The Caps tar, supra, case is the authority to overrule
District Judge Hosack's Order (on the Plaintiff's Motion For
Summary Judgment) to the effect that the "subject to"
language of the Warranty Deed Wright to Dorsey withheld part
of DORSEY'S Lot 1.

District Judge Verby, without any

findings or conclusions held that he came to the same
conclusion that Judge Hosack did.
18-22).

(Tr. Vol., p. 319, 11.

Both District Judges should be reversed as to the

order (on summary judgment) .
VII. THE TRIAL AND ORAL ARGUMENTS AT TRIAL COMPLETION
The arguments of both counsel to the District Judge at
the

end

of

the

trial

theories advanced below.

set

forth

the

factual

and

legal

The argument by both Counsel are

reporter's transcript (Tr.) entitled Tr., Vol. 1, June 27 &
28, 2011 at page 276 through 310.
the matter under advisement,

The District Court took

and reconvened June 30,

2011

giving his findings, conclusions, and decision orally on the
record transcribed as part of Tr., Vol. 1, at Tr. Vol. 1, pp
313-329.
A.

THE CASE PRESENTED BY ROSS, BROWN, AND MURPHY BY
THEIR COUNSEL, SUPPORTING THEIR OWN ACTION, AT
CLOSING ARGUMENT.

1.

They agreed with DORSEY'S asserted proposition of
law that Plaintiffs cannot rest on the weakness of
defendant's claim of title, but rather have to put
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forth the strength of their own title.

(Tr., Vol.

1, p. 276, 1. 21 through p. 277, 1. 1)
2.

Their position for quiet title is the first deed
of record on these platted lots.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p.

277, 11. 3-5)
3.

The first deed of record was from Harker to Wright
for Lot 1, which they asserted excluded the beach
front.

4.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 279, 11. 1-6)

Their position is that fee title was reserved by
Harker from the Wright transaction.

(Tr. Vol. 1,

p. 279, 11. 14-18)
5.

The chain of title that supports their position is
the express reservation of title (emphasis added)
by Harkers, at the time when they owned it to
reserve it to themselves, excepting i t from Lot
l's conveyance.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 280, 11. 22-25, p.

281, 1. 1)
6.

The intent of Harkers that this is a common beach
front is shown in later deeds of lots 3 through 8
to Battaglia and Moore by the description of the
lots being subject to any claims to the difference
in the mean high water line of Priest Lake and the
meander line shown by government survey.

(Tr. Vol.

1, p. 281, 11. 5-10)
7.

They are not trying to take away the beach
ownership from Dorsey, they are simply trying to
get the Court to declare that is a shared

-23-

ownership four ways, among all four owners,
amongst all eight lots.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 282, 11.

2-5)
8.

So strictly speaking the issue is pretty simple,
Harkers reserved i t and reserved i t as co-owned by
all eight lots.

9.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 288, 11. 17)

The only question was whether the defendants
(Dorsey) have succeeding of depriving plaintiffs
of ownership by their adverse possession claim.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 288, 11. 19-25)

10.

That's all I have.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 288, 1. 25)

(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 289, 1. 1)
B.

THE CASE PRESENTED BY DORSEY BY THEIR COUNSEL AT
CLOSING ARGUMENT.

1.

The argument commenced by analyzing the testimony
of plaintiff's witnesses, but was interrupted by a
question from the District Judge directing counsel
to hold on just a minute.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 289 to

291 at 1. 7)

2.

The District Judge said that all along DORSEY's
counsel has contended it takes a conveyance
pursuant to 9-503 (Idaho Code) in order to obtain
ownership.

3.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 291, 11. 8-11)

The District Judge said the only thing I see that
grants any interest,

(emphasis added) is that the

owner's certification on the plat that is filed
which says "it is the intent of the owners that
Lot 1 and the 20 foot private road as shown on the
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herein plat shall include the lands and lands
lying between the sidelines produced to the mean
high water line of Priest Lake, the use of the 20
feet private road as shown on the herein plat is
hereby dedicated to the adjacent lot owners.
creates an easement.

That

It does not create a grant

or a conveyance." (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 291, 11. 15-24)
4.

DORSEY'S counsel described Lot 1 as stated by the
Owner's Certification that the north line extended
or protruded to Priest Lake. The south line also
extends out to the water line.

The water line is

a place wherever it was as the ordinary high water
mark found on the land in 1890.

Title above that

point was owned by the adjoining owner, below is
owned by the State.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 293, 11. 15-

22) (This is the Equal Footing Doctrine)
5.

What did the deed Harker to Wright reserve?

Take

i t right from the deed, the deed is not ambiguous,
its unequivocal.

It states that grantors reserve

a tract and beach lying between the high water
line and the west boundary of Lot 1.

(Tr., Vol. 1,

p. 294, 11. 1-6)
6.

Harker having done the plat and making of their
certification on the plat extending the lot to the
water, there is no tract of land because the lot
and the lake have to touch.

The west boundary of

Lot 1 is platted to adjoin the Lake so in effect
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Harker reserved a description, a statement of
something non-existence.

So our first statement

is the deed did not reserve anything to them.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 294, 11. 7-13)
7.

If they reserve something, the law is pretty
clear, something you reserve yourself stays with
yourself.

No one else has the benefit of it.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 291, 11. 20-23)
8.

Citation of law to the Court of Davis v. Gowen, 83
Idaho 204 (360 P.2d 403 (1961).

A conveyance

where the owner reserved in common with other
owners was void for all purposes as far as
creating an interest in those other owners.

(Tr. ,

Vol. 1, p. 295, 11. 9-18)
9.

According to the plat, the reserved area is part
of Lot 1.

It is Lot l's beach.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.

297, 11. 1-2)
10.

Ross, Brown, and Murphy are judicially bound, as
the first person plaintiffs sue is Harker, and
claimed they did not get title because (emphasis
added) i t stayed in Harker because Harker reserved
it.

11.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 300, 11. 21-25)

They sued Harker.

That could be fatal to their

case, they haven't showed us they served them,
they haven't tried that case.
Defendant is DORSEY.
5)

The only other

(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 301, 11. 1-

(Actually DORSEY'S lienholder banks are parties
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too, which is irrelevant to this appeal.)
12.

That's the end of the argument.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.

302, 1. 7)
C.

ROSS, BROWN, AND MURPHY - REBUTTAL ARGUMENT BY
THEIR COUNSEL.
The rebuttal argument was very inconsistent.
a)

Harkers held back some land reserving fee

ownership, that is what the language expressed.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 305)
b)

The intent of Harkers is fairly well

expressed in the deed to Wright (Tr., Vol. 1, p.
307)
c)

Harkers conveyed one-eighth in that beach to

Wright, and reserved seven-eighths interest.

(Tr.,

Vol. 1, p. 307)
d)

In a way, its most simply distilled, that

Harker did convey Lot 1 in a way and in a manner
that DORSEY would like the Court to interpret, the
lines produced to the high water mark of the lake,
but they reserved seven-eighths for that area for
the remaining seven lots passed to Battaglia, then
passed to my clients.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 306)

In this argument Ross, Brown, and Murphy's own
counsel admitted and agreed with DORSEY that Lot 1
extended to Priest Lake!

Their only remaining

theory for quiet title was the "reservation" in
Harker.
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D.

DORSEY'S FINAL ARGUMENT AND CLOSING.
a)

Its clear that what he (Harker) purported to

keep was a piece of land that did not lie in Lot
1, so there is not a reservation of anything.
(Tr. Vol .. 1, p. 209, 11. 1-2)
The Plat extended Lot 1 to Priest Lake, so the
"reserved" land lying between Lot 1 and the Lake is nonexistent.
b)

When Frances Harker died in 1972, his wife,

Gladys, obtained a Decree Settling Final Account
and Final Distribution of Estate, filed January
20, 1972.

This Decree is trial exhibit

Defendants' Exhibit D (4 pages).

The Decree

(second page) says that Harker has a Vendor's
interest "***in and to Lot 1 in Steamboat Bay
Lots, according to the plat thereof recorded in
Book 2 of Plats, Page 125 ... which is being sold on
contract to R.G. Wright and Nitella Wright,
husband and wife".

Harker's own estate decree

says they sold Lot 1 according to the Plat, and
does not claim i t was "reserving" anything.

This

ought to be conclusive of what Harker intended.
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 309, 11. 7-22)
c)

Ahead of the Estate, real close to when they

sold to Wrights, both F.M. Harker and Gladys
Harker on October 11, 1967 recorded a Quit Claim
Deed to the Old National Bank of Washington, given
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for security purposes only pursuant to assignment
of real estate contract by Harker to Old National
Bank, which is DORSEY'S trial exhibit DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT II.

This Quit Claim Deed describes Lot

One (1) in Steamboat Bay Lots, according to the
plat thereof....

This has to refer to the escrowed

real estate contract (1966) Harker to Wright.

So,

in the only two documents by Harker after sale of
Lot 1 to Wright, best suited to know if they kept
(reserved) any of the Lot 1, they platted as
extending to Priest Lake, they did not even
purport to claim any "reservation" ownership
interest in said Lot 1.

This occurred 40 years

ago and it still means something.
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 309, 11. 22-25)
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 310, 11. 1-15)
d)

There is no dedication on the plat of a

common beach for common users, owners.
of Lot 1.

It is part

It is clear, there is no ambiguity to

try to figure out.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 308. 11. 21-

25)
e)

Attorney Featherston argued and agreed there

is a statute of limitations when you are suing for
real estate, within 5 years now possibly 20 years.
The matters sued on existed for over 30 years.
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 310, 11. 16-25)
(Idaho Code § 5-203 provides that no action for
recovery or possession can be maintained unless
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Plaintiff of his predecessor was possessed of the
property within 20 years, which statute formerly
had a 5 year period.)
f)

As to the road (private road) the use of

which was dedicated on the Plat to all adjoining
lot owners whether it created fee simple or only
use of the road, it is an easement (if the Court
says it is).

It is not a disputed issue, not in

the suit (action) or the Counterclaim.
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 311, 11. 15-22)
The foregoing ended the arguments after trial.
E.

DISTRICT JUDGE VERBY'S ORAL DECISION, JUNE 30,
2011.

The findings, conclusions, and direction for entry of
judgment were made orally on the record, and were reported
at Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 313-329.

DORSEY contends District Judge

Verby was substantially in error in the following regards in
his findings and conclusions.
District Judge Verby's Findings/Conclusions:
1.

The first survey on February 17, 1966 upon close

examination i t shows that Lot 1 is not contiguous with the
waters of Priest Lake, it shows what I characterize as a
buffer of land between the Lake and Lot 1.
DORSEY'S response is that the District Judge is in
error, in that what he called the first survey, which is the
Plat of Steamboat Bay Lots itself, which in the Owner's
Certification, signed by Harker, Harker clearly and
unambiguously states that Lot 1 shall include (emphasis
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added) the lands lying between the sidelines produced to the
water line of Priest Lake.
(Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 315,11. 9-14)
2.

All three surveys reflect and show that the west

side of Lot 1 does not intersect with the waters of Priest
Lake.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 315, 11. 14-17)
DORSEY'S response is that the District Judge's
statement is contrary to the testimony of the plaintiff's
own surveyor, Gilbert Bailey, the only surveyor that
testified.

Bailey testified all three (3) surveys were

substantially the same.

The Steamboat Bay Plat (survey 1)

had no significant discrepancy with his survey (survey 3)
except for a 2 inch iron pipe instead of a seven-eighths
drill steel at the northeast corner of Lot 1.

(Tr., Vol. 1,

p. 56, 11. 22-25); p. 57, 11. 1-5)
Surveyor Bailey also testified his survey just
confirmed Mr. Young's survey in 1998 (survey 2) and the plat
in 1966.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 58, 11. 22-25)
Bailey also testified in response to a question as
follows:

"Q. In retracing Lot 1 according to the plat
of Steamboat Bay Lots, do you find the north
line of government - excuse me, the north
line of Lot 1 of the plat extends to the
ordinary high water line of Priest Lake?"
"A.
In my professional opinion in
conjunction with the ownership certificate on
the original plat, the line would extend
through that northerly point on line monument
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to the original high water, wherever that may
be."
Further,

"Q. And would that be the same on the south
line of Lot 1?"
"A.

It would be."
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 61,11.21-23)

Bailey also gave deposition testimony, which is trial
Defendant's EXHIBIT KK (12 pages).

The plat and the 2

subsequent surveys are Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 to his
deposition.

When asked where the northwest corner of lot 1

is located, according to the plat Bailey testified:
"A. According to the plat it would be on an
extension of the northerly line through the
monument to the high water."
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 14, 1. 25 through p. 15, 1. 2)
Bailey further marked the location of the "NW"
monument, and also marked the north line of Lot 1
intersected Priest Lake as a circle on his survey attached
to his deposition, and labeled i t "Approx HW" (high water)
and testified:
"A. Well, i t would be the intersection of
the north line of the lot extended through
this point ("N/W" monument) through this
point to the mean high water of Priest Lake."
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 15, 11. 13-15)
Bailey testified that high water or mean high water is
often defined as where vegetation stops.
16, 11. 17-25).

(Tr. Vol. 1, p.

For clarification, Dorsey submits the

actual legal wording for this same mark is the "ordinary
high water" mark or line, on the Equal Footing Doctrine,
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when Idaho was admitted to the Union in 1890.
In summary, the Plat, the Surveys, and the surveyor's
testimony all agree that lot 1 extends to and abuts Priest
Lake.

Bailey agreed with DORSEY.
3.

District Judge Verby quoted the first 2 sentences

from the Plat, Owner's Certification into the record at Tr.
Vol. 1, p. 316, 11. 2-8; as 2 successive sentences.
The Owner's Certification is actually, as follows:
Owner's Certification
"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that F .M. HARKER
and GLADYS L. HARKER, his wife, certify that they
are the owners of the land embraced by the herein
plat of STEAMBOAT BAY LOTS in Gov't Lot 4, Section
27, T60N, R4W, B.M., Bonner Co., Idaho and had the
same platted into lots as shown on the herein
plat, the boundaries of which are more
specifically described as follows: [legal
description]
It is the intent of the Owners that lot 1 and
the 20-foot private road as shown on the herein
plat shall include the lands lying between the
side lines produced to the mean-high-water-line of
Priest Lake.
The use of the 20-foot Private Road as shown on
the herein plat is hereby dedicated to the
adjacent lot owners. Access to public road cannot
be guaranteed."
The first sentence only states that lot 1 and the
private road shall extend to Priest Lake.
referenced to "dedicated" or "use".
states "***The

~

There is no

The next paragraph

(emphasis added) of the 20 foot Private

Road as shown on the herein plat is hereby dedicated to the
adjacent lot owners.
In other words, only the road is dedicated to use of
the adjacent lot owners.
4.

The District Judge agreed with DORSEY that,
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"Nothing was ever conveyed from Harker to any
other lot owner because those lot owners other lot owners didn't exist."
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 322, 11. 7-8)
He went on to find that the Plaintiffs did not receive
anything, they received nothing, certainly didn't receive a
fee simple interest in the area that was reserved.

(Tr. Vol.

1, p. 322, 11. 11-16)
F.

THE ONLY GROUNDS FOR THE RELIEF GIVEN BY THE
DISTRICT JUDGE WAS THE LANGUAGE ON THE PLAT
ITSELF. DORSEY'S ARGUMENT AS TO THE IDAHO CASE
LAW RELIED UPON BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE.

District Judge Verby's finding was the "intention" of
Harker in regard to the Plat, as to what he characterized as
a "buffer of land" between Lot 1 and Priest Lake, and the
effects of such language used on the recorded Plat
certification.

(Tr. Vol. 1,

p. 315, 11. 19-23)

District Judge Verby then read the language of the
Plat, Harker's OWNER'S CERTIFICATION, into the record as two
(2) separate paragraphs.

However, DORSEY points out that

these 2 sentences are actually 2 separate paragraphs.

The

first sentence paragraph states that Lot 1 and the 20 foot
private road include the lands between the sidelines
produced the mean high water line of Priest Lake. This
sentence does not just refer to Lot 1 sidelines as extended
to Priest Lake, but rather i t says "Lot 1 and the 20 feet
private road" shall (both) extend to Priest Lake.
The second sentence paragraph does not at all refer to
Lot 1, and i t shows Harker is only referring to the private
road, wherein i t states that "The use (emphasis added) of
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the 20 foot private road is dedicated (emphasis added) to
the adjacent lot owners.

The word "use" and the word

"dedicated" refer only and specifically to the 20 foot
private road.

Harker did not use the words use or dedicated

in reference to Lot 1 or any portion of Lot 1, but used them
only in reference to the 20 foot Private Road.
District Judge Verby then stated,
"The language on the plat I find to be
ambiguous as a matter of law."
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 317,11.8-9)
He cited (as Bonner v. Lefee (sic»

which is Bondy v.

Levy, 121 Idaho 993 (1992) for the proposition that because

the language is reasonably subject to conflicting
interpretation, he finds i t ambiguous.

Judge Yerby's

foregoing statement is a conclusion, without any stated
reference to fact, language, or finding. He does not state
what words, sentence, or language are reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretation.
interpretation?

What is one reasonable

What are the different reasonable

interpretations? DORSEY submits the conflicting reasonable
interpretations are unknown and were definitely not stated
by District Judge Verby.
DORSEY further submits that the Owner's Certification
is clear and unambiguous as stated by Harker that,
a)

The first sentence/paragraph clearly states for

Lot 1 and 20 foot private road that the sidelines of both
extend to Priest Lake.

There is nothing about use or

dedication mentioned.
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b)

The second sentence/paragraph clearly states that

use of the 20 foot private road is dedicated to all
adjoining lot owners.
The question of whether a contract is ambiguous or not
is a question of law over which the Supreme Court may
exercise free review, except where neither party argued an
ambiguity, the Supreme Court in exercise of free review
applies the plain meaning of words used.
Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993
829 P.2d 1342 (1992)
Mortensen v. Stewart Title
149 Idaho 437 at 442, 235 P.3d 387 (2010)
So, on this appeal the Supreme Court may exercise free
review as to whether the 2 separate sentence/paragraphs on
the Owner's Certification by Harker are ambiguous or not.
DORSEY submits the Owner's Certification is clear and
unambiguous.

Cited in the foregoing Bondy case, supra, is

Galaxy Outdoor Advertising v. Idaho Transportation
Department, 109 Idaho 692, 710 P.2d 602 (1985) where the
terms of a con tract are unambiguous, as they are,... "courts
can not revise the contract in order to make a better
agreement for the parties."

(Galaxy, 109 Idaho 692 at 695)

The Galaxy case, supra, cites to McCallum v. CampbellSimpson Motor Co, 82 Idaho 160, 349 P.2d 986
(1960) .McCallum, supra, sets forth the following rules,
"While a court may interpret agreements
voluntarily entered into, a court cannot
modify an agreement so as to create a new and
different one, nor is a court at liberty to
revise an agreement where its interpretation
is involved. Courts cannot make for the
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parties better agreements than they
themselves have been satisfied to make, and
by a process of interpretation relieve one of
the parties from the terms which he
voluntarily consented to; nor can courts
interpret an agreement to mean something the
contract does not itself contain."
(Citation to Am. Jur. and Case law)
McCallum v. Campbell-S~son Motor Co
82 Idaho 160 at 166
G.

DISTRICT JUDGE ERRED THAT THE PLAT ITSELF
DEDICATED AN EASEMENT FOR ALL 8 LOT OWNERS TO A
BUFFER OF LAND

District Judge Verby decided that the Owner's
Certification on the Plat only stated that the "***use was
dedicated."

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 323, 11. 10-14)

DORSEY agrees

that the use of the 20 foot private road was dedicated to
all adjoining lot owners, lots 1-8; however the Plat Owner's
Certification wording extended Lot 1 to Priest Lake did not
dedicate its use at all.

District Judge Verby had concluded

the Owner's Certification to be ambiguous

~ ~

matter of law

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 317, 11. 8-9), so he proceeded to find the
"intent" of Harker by using the language of the owner's
certification.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 319, 11. 12-17)

His

conclusion was,
"Now, as to the language in the plat, the
owner's certification, I do find that it was
the intention of the grantors, that is the
Harkers, to create a common private road and
private beach for the benefit of all of the
owners of the subdivision."
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 320, 11. 15-19)
This is reversible error.

Once the District Judge

found the Plat Owner's Certification language was ambiguous
as a matter of law, i t is legally incorrect to find that
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ambiguous language could be a common law dedication because
a common law dedication must be clear and unequivocal, not
"ambiguous".

The recent case of Asbury Park v. Greenbriar

Estates, 152 Idaho 338, 271 P.3d 1194 (2012), decided after
the instant action, has the identical legal issue as the
instant action.

In Asbury Park, supra, the plat language

designated Lot 39 as a common area to be owned by the lot
homeowner's association.

The CC & R's stated Lot 39 is the

intended location of a community storage facility. On the
appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court found the same result as the
district court that lot 39 had not been common dedicated to
the homeowners by the plat and CC'& R's because those
documents were inconsistent and therefore contained
ambiguity.

Asbury Park, supra, held,
" ...As we reasoned in West Wood Investments,
Inc., one cannot show a clear and unequivocal
intent to dedicate where the alleged offeror
demonstrates intent inconsistent with a
dedication.
141 Idaho at 87, 106 P.3d at
413.
In West Wood, the recorded plat and a
recorded security interest contained
inconsistent statements regarding ownership
of the real property at issue, and as a
consequence we concluded that "[t]he
surrounding circumstances of the transaction
reveal nothing more ... than an ambiguous
intent." Id.
Since "unequivocal" and
"ambiguous" are antonyms, no reasonable
person could conclude that the conflicting
(and therefore ambiguous) statements
reflected in these contradictory documents
reflected Asbury Park's unequivocal intent.
See Mo~yneux v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 54
Idaho 619, 632, 35 P.2d 651, 656 (1934)
(noting that the dictionary definition of
"unequivocal" included the meaning "Not
ambiguous"). Here, any reasonable reading of
the recorded plat and CC & Rs can only lead
to a finding that the two documents contain
inconsistent statements as to the intended
-38-

ownership of Lot 39 . ... If

Asbury Park v. Greenbriar Estates,
152 Idaho 338 at page 8
In summary, District Judge Verby found the Plat with
Owner's Certification, to be ambiguous as a matter of law,
but he found from the language of the Owner's Certification
that i t was Harker's intent was to dedicate the use of the
"buffer of land" to all 8 lot owners.

The legal and

dictionary definition of the common law dedication
requirement of "clear and unequivocal" includes the meaning
"not ambiguous".
District Judge Verby found the plat language as
ambiguous, i.e. reasonably subject to conflicting
interpretation.

As a matter of law a common law dedication

requires clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate.

Clear

and unequivocal intent from the Owner's Certification by
Harker cannot be ambiguous.
District Judge Verby recognized the lack of a clear and
unequivocal dedication he said "so inartfully the Harkers
try to make their intentions known in the owner's
certification."
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 318, 11. 11-13)
VIII.THE DISTRICT JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED AN EASEMENT
BECAUSE IT WAS NEVER PLED OR ARGUED.
A claim for relief must be pled in the Amended
Complaint. Mortensen v. Stewart

Tit~e

Guarantee, 149 Idaho

437, 443-444, 253 P.3d 387, 393-394 (2010).

supra, explains that,
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Mortensen,

[16,17]"*** This Court has already expressly
rejected the notion that an unpleaded claim
can be preserved for appeal merely because
the district court addressed the claim's
merits.
Pleading is necessary to put the
opposing party on notice of the claims it is
facing and thereby "insure that a just result
is accomplished." Seiniger Law Office, 145
Idaho at 246-47, 178 P.3d at 611-12. An
unpleaded cause of action simply cannot be
considered, whether on summary judgment or on
appeal. Estes v. Bar~, 132 Idaho 82, 86, 967
P.2d 284, 288 (1998). For example, in Beco
v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865
P.2d 950 (1993), this Court refused to
consider the appellant's unpleaded breach-ofcontract claim despite the fact that the
district court ruled on the claim's merits.
Id. At 865, 865 P.2d at 956.

Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co.
149 Idaho 437 at 444
Ross, Brown, and Murphy pled for the relief of coowning or being co-tenants of the beach front/buffer strip
of land.

They never sought the relief of having an

"easement", which is defined as the right to use the land of
another.
easement.

At the final arguments they never argued for an
Neither counsel argued "easement" as grounds for

relief to Ross, Brown, and Murphy.

District Judge Verby,

evidently on his own theory saw the word "use" in the
Owner's Certification which dedicated the use of the 20 foot
private road to adjoining lot owners.

He then inserted

"use" as meaning "easement" and applied "use" to the Owner's
Certification preceding sentence/paragraph, which does not
even mention "use" or "dedication".
buffer of land was an "easement".

He found the use of the
He granted relief solely

as an "easement".
I.R.C.P. 8(a) (1) the general rules of pleading requires
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pleading the claim showing entitlement to relief.
may be alternate or of several types.

Relief

However, Ross, Brown,

and Murphy never pled, claimed, or argued as alternate
relief, the right of use, i.e. an easement.

District Judge

Verby should be reversed on granting an easement to Ross,
Brown, and Murphy.
The dedicated use of the 20 foot roadway was never
pled, never argued, never tried, and never defended against.
It was not an issue of this action.

The Judgment, paragraph

6, enters a declaratory judgment that the Common Area (also
has been referred to as buffer of land, beach area, disputed
land) is a shared perpetual easement appurtenant to and
benefitting all eight (8) lots of the Plat of steamboat Bay.
(R. Vol. 2, p. 274, para. 6)
H.

ROSS, BROWN, AND MURPHY CANNOT HAVE A PRIVATE
DEDICATED EASEMENT IN THE BUFFER OF LAND
BENEFITTING THEIR PROPERTY.

This action was all about quiet title to coownership/co-tenancy, of what the District Judge referred to
as the "buffer of land".

Outside the pleadings, trial, and

theories argued, District Judge Verby found the Plat
"intention"

dedicated~,

i.e an appurtenant easement to

all 8 lots, lot owners, Lots 1-8 (Judgment, para. 7, R. Vol.
2,p.274).
Idaho law does not provide for a private dedication of
an easement.

In Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, Coward

sought a private easement for an alley by a deed that served
the same function as dedicating an alley to public use in a
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recorded subdivision plat.

This claim of Coward is set

forth in Coward v. Had2ey, 150 Idaho 282 at 288-298, but was
denied because,
"There can be no private dedication to a
restricted class of individuals, such as
those only owning property abutting an alley.
The rule that a common-law dedication must be
for public use has always been a part of
Idaho jurisprudence. "The essential elements
of a common law dedication of land are (1) an
offer by the owner, clearly and unequivocally
indicated by his words or acts evidencing his
intention to dedicate the land to a public
use, and (2) an acceptance of the offer by
the public." Wor~ey Highway Dist. v. Yacht
C~ub of Coeur d'A~ene/ Ltd., 116 Idaho 219,
225, 775 P.2d 111, 117 (1989) (emphasis added)
(quoting Pullin v. Victor, 103 Idaho 879,
881, 655 P.2d 86, 88 (Ct.App.1982); see also
Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 143, 118
P.2d 740, 743 (1941) (considering whether
there had been a public dedication to a
city). It is true that a landowner can
complete a public dedication by selling lots
referencing a recorded plat that shows public
alleys and streets. Sadd2ehorn Ranch
Landowner's, Inc. v. Dyer, 146 Idaho 747,
750-51; 203 P.3d 677; 680-81 (2009). The
dedication, however, is not simply to the
properties abutting the private way but is
for public access and administration. Boise
City v. Hon, 14 Idaho 272, 278, 94 P. 167,
168 (1908).
Requiring the dedication to be to the
public, and not to individuals or to a class
of private grantees, is a widely accepted
principle:
The essence of a dedication is that i t
is for the use of the public at large.
There may be a dedication for special
uses, but i t must be for the benefit of
the public. There can be no dedication
to private uses or for a purpose bearing
an interest or profit in the land . .. ff
Further, Coward, supra, at 289, held,
"Thus, whenever a plat or deed attempts to
dedicate land to a group that includes less
than the general public, the dedication
fails."
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(Cases cited to Fla. And Kan.)
According, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Coward
could have no dedicated easement over Hadley's lot... "The
proper way to acquire an easement is to resort to existing
legal and equitable theories."
Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282 at 282
IX.DORSEY'S ARGUMENT ON ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED ON APPEAL
DORSEY requests an award of attorney fees on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code §12-121, which states that in any
,

--

civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney fees
to the prevailing party.

I.R.C.P. 54(e) (1) has the

provision that attorney fees may be awarded only if the
Court finds the case was brought, pursued, or defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.

Pursuant

to I.A.R. 41, DORSEY claims attorney fees on appeal.

Ross, Brown, and Murphy, at no point, pled or
any reasonable grounds for relief.

ar~~ed

They acknowledge the law

that in quiet title they must prevail, if at all, on the
strength of their own title.

They never offered any

evidence of title, they had no conveyance of title required
by Idaho Code § 9-503.
Ross, Brown, and Murphy never had any possession of the
real estate at issue or instrument of conveyance.

The

operative plat and Harker to Wright Deed all occurred in
1966.

Idaho Code § 5-203 barred the action they filed over

30 years later, in 2009.

Idaho Code § 5-205 also barred the

action based on the same time period.
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Idaho Code §5-207

provides that Wright and Dorsey are presumed to have
adversely held the property.
In the Amended Complaint, Ross, Brown, and Murphy
dropped out their original claim that Harker intentionally
left a common beach area as "unplatted" and dedicated that
common beach as co-owned by all 8 lot owners.

They conceded

to DORSEY'S claim that Lot 1 was platted by Harker's Owner's
Certification so as to include all the land extended to
Priest Lake.

The only Amended Complaint grounds for relief

was that the Harker to Wright, Warranty Deed, reservation

"*** resulted in the reservation and creation of a

language,

common beach ara (sic - area) for the benefit of all owners
of Steamboat Bay Lots."

(R. Vol. 2, p. 195, para X).

Correctly so, District Judge Verby ruled that the
reservation language created no rights in Ross, Brown, and
Murphy, as a matter of law pursuant to Davis v. Cowen
Idaho 204.

j

83

Ross, Brown, and Murphy did not Cross-Appeal.

They cannot assert errors of the District Court.
Ross, Brown, and Murphy never pled or argued the
Owner's Certification was ambiguous, nor did they plead or
argue as grounds for relief that the Plat created any
easement in their favor.
In summary, under no theory, law, request for relief,
or tried facts could Ross, Brown, and Murphy prevail.
Ross, Brown, and Murphy alleged that vested title to
the disputed strip by the reservation language remained in
Harker.

They had no fact, instrument, or law on a basis for
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relief to obtain it from Harker.

They never could "prevail"

based on their own Amended Complaint.
CONCLUSION
DORSEY seeks relief on appeal, as follows:
1.

The Judgment should be reversed and the Amended

Complaint dismissed as no relief should have been granted to
Ross, Brown, and Murphy.
2.

Ross, Brown, and Murphy sued in quiet title,

seeking co-ownership of the real estate at issue, also
called disputed strip, beach area, or buffer of land, which
they claimed as a co-owned parcel.

They must succeed on the

strength of their own title, to which they had none, and
they may not rely on the weakness of DORSEY'S title.

Quiet

title of any sort, ownership or easement, should be denied
and Judgment entered against them.

3.

The Plat of

Ste~~~oat

Bay,

subseq~ent

Surveys, and

testimony of Mr. Bailey, Ross, Brown, and Murphy's Surveyor,
created Lot 1 as extending to Priest Lake.

There was no

land between Lot 1 and Priest Lake to "reserve".
conveyed Harker to Wright and Wright to Dorsey.

Lot 1 was
Title

should be quieted in DORSEY.
4.

District Judge Verby found the Owners'

Certification to be ambiguous as a matter of law.

Accepting

that for argument purposes, an ambiguous Plat could not be a
clear and unequivocal dedication.

The finding of a common

law dedication should be reversed.
5.

The findings, conclusions, and subsequent Judgment
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granting recovery to Ross, Brown, and Murphy for use i.e. an
appurtenant easement to all lots was an unpled, untried,
unargued surprise result, and should be reversed.
6.

The Judgment granting a private easement to Ross,

Brown, and Murphy based on a plat dedication is not Idaho
law, and a private dedication them as adjoining lot owners
fails.
7.

DORSEY is entitled to recover attorney fees and

costs, pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54(e) (1)
and I.A.R. 41.
8.

Idaho Code § 5-203 (action to recover realty) the

Amended Complaint, § 5-205 as a 5 year or 20 year statute of
limitations bars the Amended Complaint.

Idaho Code § 5-207

provides that DORSEY (and his predecessor Wright) are deemed
to have held the property adversely, and a decree of title
entered in DORSEY.
9.

In the Harker/Wright Warranty Deed conveying Lot

1, "grantors reserve" in themselves a common beach for all
lot owners.
time.

Harkers did own all remaining lots (2-8) at the

By the time of this action, 2009, Harkers owned no

lots in the Plat.

DORSEY seeks the relief of quiet title to

Lot 1.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

12'TIf day

of September,

2012.

Finney
ey for Appellants
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